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SEXUAL PRIVACY IN THE MODERN ERA: LOWE V. SWANSON 
Katie Rasfeld Terpstra∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal judges have sex on the brain.  It’s not entirely their fault: a 
litany of sexual privacy cases has swamped the court system following 
the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas.1  The 
Lawrence Court upheld sexual privacy, but the muddled language of the 
decision has led to numerous subsequent battles over the precise 
meaning of the case.2  The circuits are split over the implications of the 
Lawrence decision in related sexual matters.3 
The Sixth Circuit has recently weighed in on this debate.  In Lowe v. 
Swanson, the court refused to invalidate an Ohio statute that in part 
forbids stepparents from engaging in consensual sexual conduct with 
their adult stepchildren.4  The holding is based on the court’s reading of 
Lawrence as being based on rational basis review, as not creating a 
fundamental right to adult sexual privacy, and as not applying to 
anything other than consensual homosexual activity.5  The court’s 
interpretation of Lawrence squarely plants the Sixth Circuit in line with 
the Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh circuits in limiting the Lawrence 
holding as it relates to adult sexual privacy.6 
But did the Lowe court get it right?  The First, Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits would likely say no, reading Lawrence much more broadly than 
their sister circuits.7  The novel nature of the question presented in Lowe 
coupled with the sharp divide in the circuits after the Lawrence case 
requires special attention as to what Lawrence means for consenting 
sexual encounters between stepparents and adult stepchildren.  Through 
careful consideration of the Lawrence Court’s language and actions, 
along with practical and legal concerns related specifically to stepparent 
and stepchild relationships, it becomes apparent that Lowe v. Swanson 
 
            ∗    Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 2. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008); Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 
762 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 3. See, e.g., Cook, 528 F.3d 42; Seegmiller, 528 F.3d 762. 
 4. Lowe v. Swanson, 663 F.3d 258, 260 (6th Cir. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 
(West 2012). 
 5. See Lowe, 663 F.3d 258. 
 6. See id.; Seegmiller, 528 F.3d 762; Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2005); Williams v. 
Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family 
Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).   
 7. Cook, 528 F.3d 42; Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008); Reliable 
Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008).  
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was wrongfully decided. 
This case note will first examine in Part II the background of the 
issue, including Lawrence, various related Circuit Court decisions, and 
Lowe itself.  Part III will be dedicated to the careful analysis of the 
different challenges and interpretations of Lawrence as they apply to 
Lowe and stepparent and stepchild relationships. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Modern sexual privacy law has developed rapidly over the decade 
following Lawrence.  A brief historical overview is necessary to 
appreciate fully the debate that lead to the Lowe decision.  First, 
Lawrence will be discussed, followed by an examination of the divide in 
the Circuit Courts.  Finally, Lowe itself will be presented. 
A. Lawrence v. Texas 
In Lawrence v. Texas, the petitioners were convicted of violating a 
Texas statute that prohibited certain consensual sexual activity between 
members of the same sex.8  The Court held that the statute violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Constitution, saying that the petitioners were 
free to “engage in private conduct in the exercise of their liberty.”9  The 
Court expressly overturned the Bowers v. Hardwick decision, which had 
previously stated that such anti-sodomy laws were constitutional.10 
It is how the Court came to invalidate the statute that has led to all the 
subsequent debate.  Nowhere in the decision did the Lawrence Court 
explicitly say that adult sexual privacy is a fundamental right.11  
Additionally, the Court did not follow the usual Washington v. 
Glucksburg formula for laying out a fundamental right.12  The majority 
also failed to respond to Justice Scalia’s assertion in his dissent that the 
majority did not create a fundamental right to sexual privacy.13  Finally, 
the Lawrence majority concluded, “[t]he Texas statute furthers no 
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
 
 8. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562–63 (2003).  Namely, that activity was homosexual 
sodomy.  Id. 
 9. Id. at 558. 
 10. Id. at 578; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
 11. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
 12. See id.; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). Under the Glucksberg 
formula, to create a fundamental right under substantive due process the Court must: (1) describe the 
right and its scope in detail, and (2) describe how the right are “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.”  Id. 
 13. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558–79; id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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individual’s personal and private life.”14  This language draws upon the 
traditional language used when applying the low-level rational basis 
review and when no fundamental right is present.15 
However, it is not clear that a fundamental right was not expressed in 
Lawrence and that a heightened level of judicial review was not used.16  
The cases the Lawrence Court relied on all contained a protected liberty 
interest in sexual matters.17  Furthermore, the Court specifically adopted 
Justice Stevens’s dissent from Bowers and said that this opinion should 
control in Lawrence.18  In his dissenting opinion in Bowers, Stevens 
described the sexual privacy line of cases as establishing a fundamental 
right for adults to engage in private intimate conduct.19  Some of the 
language used by the majority in the Lawrence opinion is illuminating.  
The opinion states, for example, that “liberty gives substantial protection 
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matter 
pertaining to sex,”20 and that the Due Process Clause allowed the 
petitioner’s conduct because “[i]t is a promise of the Constitution that 
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not 
enter.”21  Finally, it is difficult to reconcile the majority’s rejection of 
the statute using rational basis review with the fact that promotion of 
morality has been found to be a legitimate state interest in the past.22 
The intended reach of the Lawrence opinion, including the continued 
viability of morality laws, is also ambiguous.  In his dissent, Justice 
Scalia is clear that he believes the majority’s adoption of Justice 
Stevens’s dissent in Bowers “effectively decrees the end of all morals 
legislation,” meaning that laws against “fornication, bigamy, adultery, 
adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity” cannot survive even rational basis 
review.23  The majority is not explicit in its intentions for morality laws 
or the reach of its opinion, and Scalia’s observations are not unfounded.  
The majority itself summarized Stevens’s Bowers dissent as holding 
“the fact that a State’s governing majority has traditionally viewed a 
 
 14. Id. at 560 (majority opinion). 
 15. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 16. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558–79. 
 17. Id. at 565–66.  These cases were: Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating 
a state law prohibiting the use of contraceptives and family planning counseling); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried 
people); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing the fundamental right to an abortion); Carey v. 
Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating a state law forbidding the sale and distribution 
of contraceptives to people under the age of 16). 
 18. Lawrence, 536 U.S. at 577–78. 
 19. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J. dissenting).  
 20. Lawrence, 536 U.S. at 572. 
 21. Id. at 578 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)). 
 22. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991). 
 23. Lawrence, 536 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a 
law prohibiting the practice.”24  Furthermore, the Court went on to say 
its “obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate its own 
moral code.”25 
The majority only alluded to the scope of its holding, never directly 
addressing Scalia’s observations.26  These allusions to the scope of the 
decision included a mandate that the State should not attempt to “define 
the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a 
person or abuse of an institution the law protects.”27 and by pointing out 
that “[t]he present case does not involve minors.  It does not involve 
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in 
relationships where consent might not easily be refused.”28   
With both the controversial nature of the decision of Lawrence v. 
Texas and ambiguous language of the majority’s opinion, the Lawrence 
decision was bound to create discord among the circuits in related areas, 
and that is exactly what it has done. 
B. Circuits that Construe Lawrence Narrowly 
The Eleventh Circuit first considered the implications of Lawrence in 
Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children & Family Services.29  
The court opined that Lawrence was about “establish[ing] a greater 
respect than previously existed in the law for the right of consenting 
adults to engage in private sexual conduct.”30  However, the court failed 
to find that Lawrence had created a fundamental right, noting that the 
traditional Glucksberg analysis was missing and the language used to 
invalidate the statute in Lawrence was rational basis review.31 
The Eleventh Circuit again was asked to find a fundamental right to 
sexual privacy in Williams v. Attorney General of Ala. and refused.32  
The court echoed the reasoning in Lofton for not finding a fundamental 
right, adding that the Supreme Court has been presented with multiple 
opportunities to find a fundamental right to sexual privacy and has 
 
 24. Id. at 560. 
 25. Id. at 559. 
 26. See id. at 558–79. 
 27. Id. at 567. 
 28. Id. at 578. 
 29. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a Florida law prohibiting homosexual foster 
parents and guardians from adopting children was not unconstitutional).  
 30. Id. at 815–16. 
 31. Id. at 816–17. 
 32. 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that an Alabama statute prohibiting the commercial 
distribution of devices that were primarily for sexual stimulation was not unconstitutional). 
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always declined to do so.33  Furthermore, according to the majority, 
Lawrence only established the unconstitutionality of laws criminalizing 
adult consensual sodomy and did not create a fundamental right to 
homosexual sodomy.34  The court went on to apply rational basis, 
naming public morality as the legitimate state interest sufficient to 
uphold the challenged law.35 
In Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City the Tenth Circuit also refused to find 
that Lawrence created a fundamental right to sexual privacy.36  The 
court stated that the Supreme Court has never validated a broad 
description to a liberty interest such as the right “to engage in a private 
act of consensual sex,”37 and went on to find that rational basis, not 
heightened scrutiny, was applied in Lawrence.38 
Finally, in the Seventh Circuit case Muth v. Frank, the Court upheld a 
Wisconsin statute that criminalized incestuous relationships, even if they 
were between two consenting adults.39  The court distinguished the 
sodomy statutes in Lawrence from the incest statute in question, simply 
stating that Lawrence did not address incest statutes and thus the 
petitioner could not benefit from the holding in Lawrence.40  Like the 
similarly-minded circuits, the Seventh Circuit also denied that a 
fundamental right to sexual privacy was created and asserted that 
rational basis was the standard of review used in Lawrence.41 
C. Circuits that Construe Lawrence Broadly 
Although the Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits are all in 
agreement about what Lawrence stands for, other circuit courts disagree.  
The First Circuit summarized its position in Cook v. Gates, stating: 
Taking into account the precedent relied on by Lawrence, the tenor of its 
language, its special reliance on Justice Stevens’ Bowers dissent, and its 
rejection of morality as an adequate basis for the law in question, we are 
convinced that Lawrence recognized that adults maintain a protected 
liberty interest to engage in certain ‘consensual sexual intimacy in the 
 
 33. Id. at 1235–36. 
 34. Id. at 1236. 
 35. Id. at 1250. 
 36. 528 F.3d 762 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that the city did not violate the Constitution when it 
reprimanded the petitioner, a police officer, for having off-duty, consensual sexual encounter with 
another adult). 
 37. Id. at 770. 
 38. Id. at 771. 
 39. 412 F.3d 808, 810 (7th Cir. 2005).  
 40. Id. at 817. 
 41. Id. at 818. 
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home.’42   
However, the court noted that even though Lawrence recognized a 
fundamental right to sexual privacy, the Supreme Court did not apply 
strict scrutiny to invalidate the Texas statute.43  Rather, the Lawrence 
Court applied some standard between rational basis and strict scrutiny.44 
The Ninth Circuit in Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force acknowledged the 
split in the lines of interpretation of Lawrence and declared that in 
ambiguous circumstances, courts should look to what the Supreme 
Court actually did in the case rather than isolating relevant pieces of 
text.45  In so doing, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Lawrence Court 
had applied a heightened level of scrutiny because rational basis review 
affords such a minimal level of protection, and the rationale for the 
holding in Lawrence is inconsistent with how rational basis review is 
used.46  Like the Cook court, the Witt court ultimately found that an 
intermediate standard of review is appropriate after Lawrence, stating 
that the “government must advance an important governmental interest, 
the intrusion must significantly further that interest, and the intrusion 
must be necessary to further that interest.”47 
In Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, the Fifth Circuit held against 
the State attempting to justify laws that limit sexual privacy under a 
“morality” justification.48  The court stated that upholding a statute that 
controls what people do in private based on a morality justification 
alone would be to ignore Lawrence and its holding that this type of 
justification is insufficient.49  Interestingly, the court declined to 
examine the level of review used in Lawrence50 and simply stated that 
the only way to make sense of Lawrence is to read it as recognizing a 
right to sexual privacy without delving in to a lengthy analysis.51 
 
 42. 528 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” statute did not 
violate the Constitution even after the Lawrence decision). 
 43. Id. at 55. 
 44. Id. at 56. 
 45. 527 F.3d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding petitioner’s case for further review using an 
intermediate standard to determine if her off-duty sexual relationship with a civilian woman and 
subsequent suspension under “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” violated her constitutional rights). 
 46. Id. at 816–17.  The Court stated, “Were the Court applying rational basis review, it would not 
identify a legitimate state interest to “justify” the particular intrusion of liberty at issue in Lawrence; 
regardless of the liberty involved, any hypothetical rationale for the law would do.”  Id. at 817. 
 47. Id. at 819. 
 48. 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that a Texas statute that criminalized the selling, 
advertising, giving or lending of any sexual stimulation device except for a few narrow exceptions is 
unconstitutional).  
 49. Id. at 745–46. 
 50. See id. at 744–45. 
 51. Id. at 744. 
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D. Lowe v. Swanson 
With the circuits so sharply divided in their readings of Lawrence, the 
Sixth Circuit joined the split with its holding in Lowe v. Swanson.52  In 
Lowe, the petitioner had engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with 
his 22 year old stepdaughter.53  This violated an Ohio statute that 
prohibited stepparents from engaging in sexual conduct with their 
stepchildren, and the petitioner was charged with sexual battery.54 
Lowe petitioned the trial court to drop his charges, arguing that the 
statute is intended to apply when a child is involved, not two adults, and 
that the government has “no legitimate interest in regulating sexual 
activity between consenting adults.”55  The court denied his motion, and 
Lowe pled no contest to the charge.56  The Ohio Court of Appeals and 
the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld his conviction, stating that 
“Lawrence did not announce a ‘fundamental’ right to all consensual 
adult sexual activity,”57 and that Lawrence had applied rational basis 
review and thus rational basis applied to Lowe.58 
The Sixth Circuit declined to engage in an analysis of Lawrence in 
order to determine the appropriate standard of review in sexual privacy 
cases or to determine if Lawrence upheld a privacy right for adult 
consensual activity.59  Instead, the court simply denied Lowe’s petition 
for habeas relief, citing the split between the circuits as proof that the 
Ohio courts had not unreasonably misapplied federal law.60 
The Lowe court aligned itself with the Muth court, stating that 
Lawrence is inapplicable to the present case because Lawrence did not 
address incest or incest-like statutes.61  The court found that Lawrence 
specifically excluded statutes such as the one in question from 
consideration, reasoning that stepparent and stepchild relationships are 
of such type where the stepchild may be coerced into the activity and 
consent may not be easily refused.62 
The court also found that the state of Ohio has a far greater interest in 
regulating the sexual relationships between stepparents and stepchildren 
than Texas had in regulating homosexual sodomy.  The State’s 
 
 52. 663 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 53. Id. at 259–60. 
 54. Id. at 260; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (West 2012). 
 55. Lowe, 663 F.3d at 260. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (citing State v. Lowe, 2005 WL 1983964, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2005)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 264. 
 62. Id.  
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“paramount concern is protecting the family from the destructive 
influence of intra-family, extra-marital sexual contact . . .” and this 
interest was left intact after the Lawrence decision.63  The court 
dismissed Lowe’s assertions that a vague governmental interest in 
protecting family units is insufficient to validate the statute as applied to 
him because there had been no evidence on the record of any familial-
like relationship with the stepdaughter or “family unit” ever existed.  
Instead, the court asserted that the State has an interest to protect all 
families against sexual contact that may be harmful to the family unit, 
regardless of the facts surrounding any particular family dynamic in 
question.64 
Finally, the court found no merit in Lowe’s claim that the Ohio 
statute violates Lawrence because it is based on morality.  First, the 
Sixth Circuit stated that the statute is not entirely premised on morality 
and that Ohio “has a legitimate and important interest in protecting 
families.”65  Second, the Court denied that Lawrence invalidated all 
criminal laws that are based in part on morality.66   
The hasty analysis of Lawrence the Sixth Circuit undertook in Lowe 
v. Swanson, coupled with the novel question presented within the case, 
leaves the need for a more methodical and critical look into Lawrence 
and its varying interpretations to determine how laws regarding 
consensual relationships between stepparents and their adult 
stepchildren should be handled. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Several facets of the Lawrence and Lowe holdings require close 
scrutiny.  This Part will first consider if Lawrence applies to stepparent 
and stepchild sexual relationships, followed by a discussion of whether 
Lawrence created a fundamental right and what standard of review 
applies to cases governed by Lawrence.  Finally, this Part will conclude 
with an analysis of Lowe under Lawrence. 
A. Does Lawrence Apply? 
Despite what the Lowe and Muth courts assert, Lawrence is certainly 
about more than just homosexual sodomy.  The common law system 
simply does not operate in such a way that confines each case’s 
precedental value to the narrow factual circumstances giving rise to the 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 264–65. 
 65. Id. at 264. 
 66. Id. 
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suit, unless the court is explicit in its intentions to hold so narrowly.67  
Although the Lawrence Court is vague about the scope of its holding, 
the language of Lawrence and its continuous use by lower circuits in a 
wide array of “taboo” sexual conduct cases shows that its holding 
governs more than homosexual sodomy.68  The Lawrence Court’s 
decree that a state should not attempt to “define the meaning of the 
relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of 
an institution the law protects” implicates the idea that the Court viewed 
its decision in Lawrence decision as reaching into all laws governing 
sexual relationships.69  This language does, however, carve out two 
exceptions where the state’s interests can overcome sexual privacy: first, 
where there is injury to a person; and second, if it would violate “an 
institution the law protects.”70 
Thus, incest and incest-like statutes fall within Lawrence’s broad 
sexual privacy realm and are governed by Lawrence, but whether or not 
they enjoy the same protection as homosexual sodomy depends on 
whether or not they fit within one of these two exceptions.71 
The first exception, injury to a person, does not automatically apply 
solely because the relationship is between a stepparent and stepchild.  
Sexual conduct between a stepparent and stepchild could fall into this 
category if, for example, one of the parties were a minor, were mentally 
handicapped, or did not consent to the activity.  However, this is true for 
every instance of sexual activity regardless of the relationship between 
the parties involved.  Just because the two participating individuals have 
a stepparent and stepchild relationship does not necessarily mean that 
one of them will be injured by the sexual conduct.  The plain meaning of 
the Lawrence decision is that the exception only applies when there is 
actually an injury to a party, not merely the possibility of an injury.72  To 
hold otherwise would give states the power to curtail the vast majority 
of all sexual conduct because of a possibility of injury.  Looking 
specifically at the Lowe case, the stepchild consented to the activity and 
was neither a minor nor mentally handicapped.73  No facts on the record 
suggested that she was injured in any way at all, much less that she was 
 
 67. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 68. See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 
F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
 69. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
 70. See id. 
 71. In a separate case, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that the statute in question in Lowe v. 
Swanson, Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.03(A), is “quite obviously designed to be Ohio’s criminal incest 
statute.”  State v. Noggle, 615 N.E.2d 1040, 1042 (1993).  
 72. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 73. See Lowe v. Swanson, 663 F.3d 258, 259–60 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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injured because of her legal status as Lowe’s stepdaughter.74 
The Lowe court pointed to the fear of coercion as a factor in 
upholding the Ohio statute.75  More specifically, the court reasoned that 
because of the nature of stepparent and stepchild relationships, consent 
may not easily be refused.76  However, fear of coercion is not a 
compelling enough reason to keep the statute or to say that this causes 
stepparent and stepchild relationships to fall under this “injury” 
category.  Although it is likely true that some stepparents abuse their 
position in gaining the “consent” of their stepchildren, it is not always 
true, and it is not the situation in Lowe.  It is undisputed that the 
stepchild in Lowe consented, and there was no indication that the 
consent was coerced.77  It is not only conceivable that a stepparent and 
stepchild could have a non-coerced consensual relationship, but it is 
actually what happened in Lowe.78  Again, lumping all stepparent and 
stepchild relationships into this injury to a person exception sweeps too 
broadly. 
Furthermore, coerced “consent” is not truly consent at all, and thus 
rape laws apply.79  Any time consent is not given and sexual activity 
occurs the sexual activity is illegal, regardless of the legal relationship of 
the participants.80  It is just as illegal for a person to have non-
consensual sex with their spouse as it is with their adult stepchild.81  
Because rape laws apply to these types of scenarios, it serves no real 
purpose to have a separate body of law also prohibiting coercion.  
Taking into account practical considerations as well, stepparents are 
much more likely to know that coerced sexual activity is illegal because 
it is a form of rape, rather than know it is illegal because it occurs with 
their stepchild.  Thus, the Ohio statute provides no deterrence effect for 
this undesirable conduct.  It is simpler and more logical to allow rape 
laws to cover the scenarios within stepparent and stepchild relationships 
that result in actual injury to a party, and to invalidate the categorical 
prohibitions of stepparent and stepchild relationships that sweep too 
broadly to be considered to fit within this exception in Lawrence. 
The second exception to when the Lawrence protection does not 
apply is when there is “abuse of an institution the law protects.”82  
 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. at 264. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 259–60. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See, e.g., State v. Bannister, No. 07CA33, 2008 WL 2954290 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2008).  
 80. See id. 
 81. See id.  
 82. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).  
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Sexual relationships between stepparents and stepchildren do not abuse 
any institution protected by the law.  Again, it is important to note the 
Lawrence language indicates that the abuse must be actual abuse, not 
just the mere possibility of abuse.83 
The Lowe court justifies the statute in question by stating that 
stepparent and stepchild sexual relationships are damaging to the 
family.84  It is well established that states have an interest in families and 
may legally protect them, thus “familial relationships” would most 
likely be considered “an institution the law protects.”85  However, it 
cannot be said that every time a stepparent and stepchild engage in 
sexual activity with each other it is damaging to a family unit.  Lowe 
implicitly asserted this very point, stating that the government cannot 
say it is protecting a family without a finding that there was ever a 
family-like relationship including and involving both Lowe and the 
stepdaughter.86  Although the Lowe court rejected this argument, saying 
that the state may protect any “family” no matter what form, this 
generalized protection of anything that might be a family is too broad to 
fall under the exception in Lawrence, which calls for actual damage 
done to an actual family.87  To fit under the exception, there needs to be 
not only a “family” to protect, but also damage that is caused every time 
this type of conduct occurs.  Given the wide variety and types of people 
and families, it cannot be assumed that stepparent and stepchild 
relationships will always cause damage to a family. 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that every time a stepparent 
and stepchild have sexual contact it damages a family unit, the damage 
done does not necessarily rise to the level required to cause stepparent 
and stepchild relationships to be excluded from the jurisdiction of 
Lawrence.  “Abuse” is a strong term, indicating that the Lawrence Court 
did not intend to call for the prohibition of an activity merely because it 
is at odds with a legally protected institution: the activity must be so 
crippling to the institution that it can be deemed abusive.88  While 
extramarital sexual relationships in general are destructive to a family 
unit, the degree of harm caused varies greatly family to family.  It 
cannot be said that every time a spouse sleeps with another person, even 
if that other person is his or her stepchild, there has been an “abuse” of 
the familial institution.  There is nothing on the record in Lowe that 
indicates that any damage to the family unit arose due to the sexual 
 
 83. See id. 
 84. Lowe v. Swanson, 663 F.3d 258, 264–65 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 85. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 86. Lowe, 663 F.3d at 264. 
 87. Id. at 264–65. 
 88. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
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contact, much less that any damage was so severe as to be deemed 
“abusive.”  Allowing stepparent and stepchild relationships to fall under 
this exception to Lawrence would be too serious of a condemnation for 
this category of relationship without any showing of it uniformly 
causing any harm, let alone serious harm, to the institution of the family. 
To summarize, stepparent and stepchildren relationships fall within 
the jurisdiction of Lawrence.  The Lawrence case is the leading case on 
all “taboo” sexual topics, including stepparent and stepchild 
relationships, and is not solely about homosexual sodomy.  Stepparent 
and stepchild relationships such as the one described in Lowe also do not 
fall into the two exceptions to the broad reach of Lawrence because 
there is no actual injury to a person or abuse of a legally protected 
institution that automatically arises every time a stepparent and stepchild 
engage in sexual activity. 
B. Sexual Privacy as Fundamental Right 
Having determined that stepparent and stepchild sexual relations falls 
under the Lawrence line of cases, it now must be determined what 
standard of review must be applied to sexual privacy cases.  This hinges, 
in part, on whether or not Lawrence announced a new fundamental right 
to adult consensual sexual privacy. 
The arguments for and against reading Lawrence as creating a 
fundamental right have been well thought out and developed over the 
years, and there is strong support for each side.89  However, given the 
lack of clarity of the Court on this matter and the extreme weight and 
meaning that fundamental rights carry, it cannot be said that the 
Lawrence Court announced a fundamental right to sexual privacy. 
The circuits that do not read Lawrence as having created a 
fundamental right to sexual privacy, including Lowe, point out that the 
Lawrence Court never mentioned that it was creating a fundamental 
right.90  This is especially alarming given that Scalia, in his dissent, 
specifically asserted that the majority was creating a sexual privacy 
right, and yet the majority was still silent on the matter.91  This is a 
notable omission on the part of the Court and one that was not likely to 
occur if, in fact, the Court was trying to create a fundamental right to 
sexual privacy. 
Additionally, the Lawrence Court did not follow the usual 
 
 89. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008); Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 
762 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 90. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; see, e.g., Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1235 
(11th Cir. 2004). 
 91. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
12
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss3/10
2013] CASENOTE—LOWE V. SWANSON 1139 
Washington v. Glucksburg formula for announcing a fundamental 
right.92  The Court failed to describe explicitly even the scope of its 
holding, let alone the scope of any fundamental right.93  One purpose of 
the Glucksburg formula is to make clear what is or is not part of that 
fundamental right.94  Holding that a decision announces a fundamental 
right without having clear boundaries for what the right covers is simply 
unworkable and would lead to countless courtroom battles.  In the 
Lawrence opinion there is no clear indication what exactly “sexual 
privacy” covers, and this is not explicit enough to satisfy the first prong 
of the Glucksburg formula. 
The Lawrence Court also failed to fulfill the second prong of the 
Glucksburg test: describing how the right fits within the Constitution’s 
“implicit [notions] of ordered liberty.”95  The Court did examine the 
history of sexual privacy somewhat, but this examination focused 
mostly on modern history and homosexual sexual activity.96  The 
historical analysis of the issue may have been sufficient to satisfy the 
Glucksburg test if the fundamental right being asserted were a right to 
engage in homosexual sexual activity, but it was not enough to satisfy a 
broader fundamental right to sexual privacy. 
Courts holding that the Lawrence decision did announce a 
fundamental right to sexual privacy also have a strong argument.  First, 
those circuits note that the cases that the Lawrence majority relied upon 
to overturn Bowers all asserted a protected liberty interest in sexual 
matters.97  While this fact is certainly significant, it is not sufficient to 
imply that a fundamental right was created because of this reliance.  
Furthermore, the cases that the majority relied on all asserted their 
respective liberty interests in the traditional manner: they all clearly 
explained the right and described how it fits into “concept[s] of ordered 
liberty.”98 
Secondly, and more persuasively, these circuits argue that because the 
majority explicitly adopted Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers, a right 
to sexual privacy was asserted.99  In the Bowers dissent, Stevens 
described the sexual privacy line of cases as establishing a fundamental 
right for adults to engage in private intimate conduct.100  While it cannot 
 
 92. See id. at 558. 
 93. See id. at 558–79. 
 94. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). 
 95. Id.; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558–79. 
 96. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558–79. 
 97. Id. at 565–66; see, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 98. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 
(1977). 
 99. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78; e.g., Cook, 528 F.3d at 53. 
 100. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
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be denied that the general trend has been to grant more liberty interest 
rights in the sexual activities realm, this trend alone does not create a 
broad fundamental right to sexual privacy.  Allowing judicial trends in 
and of themselves to create a fundamental right to something could have 
disastrous consequences: without well-drawn lines delineating what is 
and what is not part of the right, nearly anything can be made into a 
“fundamental right.”  This line of support is also weakened by the fact 
that the Lawrence majority never re-asserted this notion from Stevens in 
Bowers in the Lawrence opinion.101  Again, something as important as 
creating a fundamental right to an activity or status cannot, and should 
not, be announced through implication. 
Deliberate steps must be taken to form the lines of any fundamental 
right, and the Lawrence Court failed to do so.  Lawrence should not be 
read as creating a fundamental right to sexual privacy because it never 
explicitly showed that it intended to create such a right, and because 
protected liberty rights are too important and too influential to allow 
them to be simply implied.  Thus, there is no fundamental right to sexual 
privacy that would include the right to stepparent and stepchild 
consensual sexual relationships. 
C. Standard of Review 
Just because the Lawrence Court did not announce a fundamental 
right to sexual activity such as stepparent and stepchild relationships 
does not mean such relationships are offered no protection under the 
law.  What standard of review should be used in subsequent “taboo” 
sexual activity cases is another area of debate after the Lawrence 
decision. 
Some circuits read Lawrence as applying a new constitutional 
standard of review, which would fall somewhere between rational basis 
and strict scrutiny.102  They call this standard heightened, or 
intermediate, review.103  These courts cite to the language used in the 
opinion as a source of support for their interpretation of what standard 
was applied.104  This language, much like the language used to make the 
argument that the court announced a protected liberty interest in sexual 
privacy, is strongly supportive of the sexual privacy right at issue and 
indicates that the Supreme Court was weighing the right heavily when 
making its decision.  For example, the Court stated, “It is the promise of 
the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the 
 
 101. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558–79. 
 102. E.g., Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2008); Cook, 528 F.3d at 53. 
 103. E.g., Witt, 527 F.3d at 816; Cook, 528 F.3d at 53. 
 104. E.g., Witt, 527 F.3d at 816; Cook, 528 F.3d at 53. 
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government may not enter.”105  This language indicates that the Justices 
recognize that sexual privacy demands a higher standard of protection 
than what rational basis review affords. 
Even more persuasively, circuits suggesting that an intermediate 
standard of review was used in Lawrence suggest that when the 
language of the Court is ambiguous, lower courts should look to what 
was actually done in the case to determine how they should proceed.106  
In Lawrence, the Court not only invalidated the Texas anti-homosexual 
sodomy law, but also overturned the previous Bowers case that held 
these types of laws to be valid.107  Although the state advanced the 
previously validated theory that promoting morality is a legitimate 
governmental interest,108 the Court nonetheless held that the law could 
not stand.  This outcome indicates that the Court was using some higher 
standard, such as intermediate review.  Using this test of looking at what 
actually happened in the case when there is ambiguity necessarily leads 
to what the Court actually meant to indicate with its holding.  Looking at 
Lawrence and using the “what actually happened” test, it is clear that the 
Supreme Court did not apply rational basis review to the sodomy laws. 
Thus rational basis does not apply to any sexual privacy right that falls 
under the jurisdiction of Lawrence; intermediate review is the correct 
standard.109 
However, there are still circuits that insist that rational basis review 
was used by the Lawrence Court, and their arguments are not without 
merit.110  First, these courts point to one passage in the Lawrence 
decision that echoes the traditional languages used when applying 
rational basis review: “The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state 
interest which can justify its intrusion into the individual’s personal and 
private life.”111  Although this language undoubtedly seems to indicate 
that rational basis review was used, there are multiple passages 
throughout the decision that appear to negate this assertion and indicate 
that a higher standard was used.112  Instead of pulling out line after line 
 
 105. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 847 (1992)). 
 106. See Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 107. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78. 
 108. Thus, under this theory, morality would be sufficient under rational basis review to justify a 
law that is under a constitutionality attack. 
 109. It is worth noting that even the Circuits that found that there was a fundamental right to 
sexual privacy say that intermediate review, not strict scrutiny, was used by the Court.  This is notable 
because strict scrutiny is the default standard when a protected liberty interest is in question.  E.g., Cook 
v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 52, 56 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 110. E.g., Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 771 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 111. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560. 
 112. For example, the majority asserted, “[L]iberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in 
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matter pertaining to sex.”  Id. at 572. 
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that supports or negates each side, it is easier in cases of such ambiguity 
to look past the text of the decision and look into what is being done.  
As indicated above, such an inquiry leads to a finding that intermediate 
scrutiny was used by the Lawrence Court. 
Additionally, these circuits argue that because no fundamental right 
was created, the default standard of review is then rational basis.113  The 
Lawrence Court, they say, invalidated the sodomy law based on rational 
basis review.114  This is a weighty argument because this is traditionally 
how the federal courts have operated in determining what standard of 
review to apply.115  However, in recent years there has been the slow 
emergence of the intermediate review standard and this automatic 
assumption of what standard applies is no longer a safe one.116  These 
circuits rely on an outdated system for determining the review standard, 
leading to illogical conclusions.  As mentioned above, courts have 
previously held that promoting morality is a legitimate state interest 
sufficient to justify any law that is challenged under rational basis 
review, but in Lawrence, the Court invalidated the statute despite the 
fact that the state is allowed to promote the “morality” behind 
prohibiting homosexual activity.117  This means that the Court, without 
explicitly saying as much, has now held either that morality is no longer 
a sufficient justification under rational basis review, or that a higher 
standard of review was used.  Justice Scalia asserted that the Court 
ended morality legislation and once again the majority was silent on this 
observation.118  Because morality legislation has a long history of being 
considered a legitimate state interest, ending all morality justification 
would be a drastic measure.  It is doubtful that the Court would discard 
such a long line of case law without expressly saying it was doing so.  
Thus, it is more likely that they Court was applying an intermediate 
standard of review, rather than asserting that promoting morality is no 
longer a legitimate state interest. 
D. Application to Lowe 
Having determined that the Lawrence holding applies to Lowe and 
any other statute prohibiting stepparent and stepchild relationships and 
that an intermediate standard of review is the appropriate standard for 
sexual privacy cases, the decision in Lowe must be re-considered using 
 
 113. E.g. Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 771–72.  
 114. Id. at 771. 
 115. E.g., Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420 (2007). 
 116. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 453–54 (1985). 
 117. E.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558–79. 
 118. Lawrence, 536 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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this standard of review. 
In order for the Ohio statute in question to survive a constitutionality 
attack under the intermediate standard of review, it must be found that 
the statute furthers an important government interest and that the statute 
is substantially related to the stated interest.119  The Lowe court, along 
with the state, essentially asserted three reasons for the creation of the 
statute: fear of coercion due to the relationship between the stepparent 
and the stepchild, a desire to protect the family unit from intra-family 
and extra-marital relationships, and the promotion of morality through 
prohibiting an incest-like activity.120 
Protecting an innocent party from being coerced into sexual activity 
that he or she truly does not consent to is undoubtedly an important 
governmental interest.  The problem with the Ohio statute is that it is not 
substantially related to this interest.  As mentioned above, any sexual 
contact that is initiated due to coercion is not consensual.  The state 
already has laws that serve the interest of prohibiting coercion into 
sexual activity without making the broad assumption that all sexual 
conduct between stepparents and stepchildren is coerced.121  With laws 
already in place to address this potential problem, there is no need to 
have an additional law that prohibits not only this type of coerced 
activity, but also all non-coerced, truly consensual sexual activity 
between two people just because they have a stepparent and stepchild 
relationship. 
Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that having this ban on all 
stepparent and stepchildren sexual relationships will prevent this 
problem from happening, much less in any “substantial” way.  This law 
likely is not well-known to people, in part because it deals with incest-
like activity rather than incest as it is generally known and defined by 
the public.122  While the average person may know that sexual relations 
with a close blood relative is prohibited by law, they likely do not know 
that the state also considers legal relationships, such as stepparent and 
stepchild relationships, incestuous.  Thus, the law has no deterrence 
effect on any stepparent with ill intentions because he or she lacks actual 
knowledge of it and because the law is broader than what the average 
person knows to be “incest”; the stepparent will not guess that his or her 
actions are prohibited and the undesired activity will not be prevented. 
 
 119. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. 
 120. Lowe v. Swanson, 663 F.3d 258, 260–64 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 121. See, e.g., State v. Bannister, No. 07CA33, 2008 WL 2954290 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2008). 
 122. For example, Dictionary.com defines incest as “(1) sexual intercourse between closely 
related persons.  (2) the crime of sexual intercourse, cohabitation, or marriage between persons within 
the degrees of consanguinity or affinity wherein marriage is legally forbidden.”  Incest, 
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/incest (last visited Nov. 21, 2012). 
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Protecting the family unit is the second interest that the court in Lowe 
outlined as being a driving force behind the statute.123  Speaking in the 
most generic terms, maintaining functional families is an important 
governmental issue.  In Lowe, the specific justification for the statute the 
court cited is protection from “the destructive influence of intra-family, 
extra-marital sexual contact.”124  This narrow justification likely would 
be considered an important governmental interest, but the central 
assumptions upon which it rests are troublesome for the “substantial 
relationship” portion of intermediate review. 
First, this justification assumes that the sexual conduct will be 
“destructive.”  As mentioned above, this is an assumption that should 
not automatically be allowed to stand.  Families no longer look or 
operate like they did in the past.  Modern families are prone to have a 
wide variety of beliefs and eccentricities.  In a family where a stepparent 
and an adult stepchild both consent to engage in sexual activity, the 
relationship boundaries between the spouses may not be defined in such 
a way that extra-marital relations would be destructive.  Automatically 
assuming that any conduct of this type will be destructive is not 
permissible.  The court did not cite to any data that shows how families 
are or have been affected by sexual activity between stepparents and 
stepchildren.125  There is simply no evidence of stepparent and stepchild 
relationships being destructive to the family unit in the manner asserted 
by the state for their important interest, and, based on the wide variety 
and types of familial relationships that exist, this blanket assumption 
that this type of relationship will be destructive is not sufficient to 
conclude that there is a substantial relationship between the state’s right 
to protect the family and the statute in question. 
Second, the justification assumes that stepparent and stepchild sexual 
relationships will be “intra-family,” implying that there is some type of 
family unit in place to begin with.  The Lowe court went as far as to say 
that the factual circumstances of the case do not matter, such as whether 
or Lowe and his stepdaughter were ever actually part of any sort of 
family unit together; the state has an interest in protecting all families 
“irrespective of the particular family dynamic.”126  By not looking into 
the facts to determine if the stepparent and stepchild in question ever 
were part of the same family, the court once again failed to acknowledge 
all the ways modern people both are and are not in families.  Under the 
statute, the court will at times do nothing to protect the dynamics of non-
legally recognized families—because of a lack of legal relationship 
 
 123. Lowe, 663 F.3d at 264. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. at 259–65. 
 126. Id. at 264–65. 
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between the parties—while punishing stepparents and stepchildren who 
were never really a part of the same family unit, just because one party 
is technically the stepparent.127 
A broad assertion of a right to protect all families no matter what type 
may be sufficient under rational basis review, but under the stricter 
standard of intermediate review it cannot suffice.  Holding that such a 
generalized interest in families of whatever type—even “families” that 
are families only on paper—is an important interest gives the 
government too much power to interfere on the privacy rights of 
citizens.  Only the more narrow interest asserted by the court in Lowe 
can be said to be an important interest because it more clearly delineates 
what the state is trying to avoid.  However, because stepparent and 
stepchild status is merely a technical, legal status that does not indicate 
to what extent, if any, both parties are members of the same family, 
there is no substantial relationship between protecting a family and 
prohibiting consenting stepchildren from having sexual relationships 
with their stepparents.  The assumption that stepparent and stepchild 
status automatically makes the pair a family is too much of a leap for the 
modern day. 
Although the state does have an important interest in protecting a 
family from “the destructive influence of intra-family, extra-marital 
sexual contact,” the Lowe court bases its conclusion that the statute in 
question is substantially related to this interest because it relies on two 
faulty assumptions.128  In modern times, it cannot be assumed that 
sexual relationships between stepparents and stepchildren will be 
destructive or will be damaging to any type of family unit.  Thus, this 
justification for the statute also fails intermediate review. 
Finally, the Court bases its justification on the ability of the states to 
promote morality.129  This line of reasoning has critical flaws after 
Lawrence.  Morality has been held to be a legitimate state interest, but 
not an important one, in previous cases.130  There is nothing in case law 
that indicates that morality alone can be a great enough justification to 
 
 127. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (West 2012). Take, for example, the following 
hypothetical situations: In family 1, the mother and her boyfriend have raised her child since the child 
was very young.  As long as the mother and the boyfriend never get married, the boyfriend and the child 
are free to engage in consensual sexual activity when the child reaches the age of majority without fear 
of punishment under the statute, despite living as a family unit for years.  In family 2, the mother meets 
her new husband late in life when her child is already an adult.  The child has never lived with the new 
husband and perhaps has never even met him before the day they decide to engage in consensual sexual 
contact.  In this scenario, the husband has committed a sexual assault by sleeping with his stepdaughter, 
despite the fact that they have never lived or functioned as a family. 
 128. Lowe, 663 F.3d at 264–65. 
 129. Id. 
 130. E.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
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satisfy an intermediate standard of review.131  In Lawrence, the majority 
appears to apply an intermediate standard when looking at the anti-
homosexual sodomy law.  The only justification for the law was that it 
was based on moral condemnation for that particular type of sexual 
activity.132  The Court voided the statute, in effect saying that a morality 
justification alone is not sufficient.133 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Lawrence majority used 
rational basis review to invalidate the statute, morality would not even 
be a sufficient justification under the lowest level of review; it would not 
even be a legitimate state interest.  Morality alone cannot itself be an 
interest important enough to justify the statute in question in Lowe. 
Thus, none of the three interests asserted by the Lowe court are 
sufficient under the intermediate standard of review to support the 
continued viability of the Ohio statute that prohibits stepparent and 
stepchild sexual relationships.  There is no substantial relationship 
between the statute and a prevention of coerced sexual contact or a 
prevention of destructive influences on the family.  Additionally, 
morality alone is not enough to be an important interest to justify the 
statute. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The muddled language of the Lawrence Court’s decision has created 
a wide rift between the circuits when it comes to upholding the right to 
adult sexual privacy.  Even so, a careful analysis reveals that the Court 
intended to afford more protection to adult sexual privacy.  The actions 
of the Court, coupled with some strong language used by the majority, 
demonstrate that an intermediate standard of review was used in 
Lawrence and is appropriate for other “taboo” sexual topics. 
One such “taboo” topic is stepparent and stepchild adult consensual 
sexual relationships.  The Ohio statute that categorically prohibits all 
stepparent and stepchild relations sweeps too broadly to satisfy the 
intermediate review required under Lawrence, and is thus 
unconstitutional.  As Lowe itself demonstrates, there is not a sufficient 
enough relationship between the state’s asserted interests, prevention of 
coercion and protection of the family, to allow a broad prohibition on 
this category of adult relationships.  By criminalizing Lowe for 
engaging in sexual contact with his consenting, adult stepdaughter, the 
state infringes on their constitutional right to privacy.  It is time for the 
 
 131. See, e.g., id. 
 132. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 133. Id. at 559–60. 
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